Appeal Watch: The Pussy Riot Verdict, Pennsylvania’s Voter ID Laws and the SCC Will Hear About Interest Rates

Russia’s Ruling on Pussy Riot: A Verdict Against Freedom of (Artistic) Expression?

On Friday, August 17, 2012, Torontonians gathered outside of the Russian consulate in protest against that nation’s treatment of three members of a feminist punk-rock collective known as Pussy Riot. The band members were on trial in faraway Moscow on charges of hooliganism, for performing an anti-Putin protest song in a Russian Orthodox Church, in March 2012. A video of the offending performance, which led to the arrest of 3 members, and their detention awaiting trial for five months, can be found here.

Russian courts handed down what has been termed lightly as a “disproportionate” verdict to the three members, by sentencing them to two years in a prison camp, with possible pardon being granted if President Putin deems it appropriate. The sentence has been greeted with protests worldwide, both within and out of Russia. And for once, artists, musicians, human rights organizations and politicians are in agreement that the ruling might in fact be unfair and unfitting to the nature of the crime. The general consensus has been that Russia still has a long way to go with regards to respecting the rights of the freedom of expression of its citizens. Could its actions also, however, be regarded as intolerance towards artistic expression in particular?

The charges against Pussy Riot were called “criminal hooliganism,” a strangely-worded offense that conjures images of primates in bandanas wreaking havoc on fruit carts. The Russian Criminal Code, defines the crime (in Ch. 24, Art. 213), as “ a gross violation of the public order which expresses patent contempt for society, attended by violence against private persons or by the threat of its use, and likewise by the destruction or damage of other people’s property.” Needless to say, the definition is sufficiently ambiguous to catch any number and forms of dissent within it, something that has repeatedly been done in the history of Russia, and during the Soviet era as well. And as this comment has pointed out, the charge of hooliganism carries such a harsh penalty precisely because of the nature of the protest it invokes – provocative and creative, thereby having the potential to carry its message forward to a large number of people.

Is the charge of “hooliganism” a formalized notion of suppressing dissent through artistic expression then? Plenty of nations around the world routinely and systematically silence artists (the state’s treatment of the Chinese dissident artist Ai Weiwei is an example), who, through their preferred media of expression, often move the mountains in public consciousness that other forms of activism cannot. These actions by governments are often characterized as affecting the freedom of expression, and of the right to dissent and express one’s opinion. But another, more pointed question might be whether it is the art and the creativity behind the protest that is being targeted. If so, it might be a testament to the continuing power of art, and its ability to serve as a mighty tool of dissent, even in the face of the most conservative state action.

Just a Political Maneuver? Pennsylvania Voter ID Laws are Upheld

As if law and politics did not intersect enough this term (re: Obamacare), another case has recently come into the spotlight.  Act 18, as it is called in Pennsylvania, would require Pennsylvania’s registered voters to present a state-approved photo ID at the polls. Though it may seem logical at first glance, critics are quick to its political motivations: Pennsylvania’s Republican Legislature passed the law with no evidence that in-person voter impersonation was a serious problem, according to Michael McGough of the LA Times. So, Democrats are up in arms. In their opinion, the law has a disproportionate impact on urban poor voters, who are more likely to vote for President Barack Obama and other Democrats in the upcoming elections.
On Wednesday, a Pennsylvania judge declined to block Pennsylvania’s voter ID law from taking effect. Judge Simpson, who sits on the Commonwealth Court, doubts that opponents can successfully show that the law violates the state’s constitution. The American Civil Liberties Association (ACLA) disagrees. They argue that the law infringes on the right to vote, which is guaranteed by the state constitution.

The ACLA promises to appeal the decision to the State Supreme Court, which is evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. In the event of a tie, the law would stay in place. (McGough points out that Judge Simpson was elected as a Republican.) There may be a serious wrinkle in this plan, though: timing. Pennsylvania is a key state in the 2012 election; even though it has typically sided with the Democrats, Republicans have gained momentum there in recent years. The ACLA and the Democrats would need the law to be overturned within a span of just three months.

The Court’s Interest in Interest

On July 26, 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it would hear the appeal in Teal Cedar Products Ltd v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 2012 BCCA 70. The appeal hearing’s tentative date is March 23, 2013.

Under the Forest Act, Teal Cedar Products Ltd. purchased a forest licence to harvest a specific volume of wood annually. Shortly before this transaction, the Ministry of Forests suspended logging in part of the area, as the Ministry considered turning the area into a provincial park. The transaction took place in 1993, and the possibility turned into a reality in July 1995, which essentially prohibited additional logging in the area Teal was licensed in. This in turn impacted Teal’s allowable annual cut in April 1999.

Teal Cedar Products made a claim for compensation for partial expropriation; their allowable annual cut was reduced. Therefore, they submitted to arbitration. This subsequently resulted in the ward that dismissed their claim for losses suffered before the reduction in its allowable annual cut, but awarded compensation after that period (which totalled $6.35 million plus compound interest) and reasonable legal costs (totalling 1.02 million). The Court in this case will have the ability to rule on the issue of compound interest, specifically whether compound interest on a pecuniary judgement can be awarded by a court, despite a statutory provision that limits pre-judgment interest. If so, what guides this discretion?  Furthermore, is compound interest available where the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation is based in statute, and the statute does not provide for compound interest? While seemingly dry, the difference between compound and simple interest could be the difference of potentially hundreds millions of dollars in subsequent litigation. Additionally, the implications it will have in remedies will reach beyond expropriation to all contractual cases, regardless of which way the Court ultimately decides for.